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The execution of coercive and legitimate power by an authority assures cooperation
and prohibits free-riding. While coercive power can be comprised of severe punishment
and strict monitoring, legitimate power covers expert, and informative procedures. The
perception of these powers wielded by authorities stimulates specific cognitions: trust,
relational climates, and motives. With four experiments, the single and combined impact
of coercive and legitimate power on these processes and on intended cooperation of
n1 = 120, n2 = 130, n3 = 368, and n4 = 102 student participants is investigated
within two exemplary contexts (tax contributions, insurance claims). Findings reveal
that coercive power increases an antagonistic climate and enforced compliance,
whereas legitimate power increases reason-based trust, a service climate, and voluntary
cooperation. Unexpectedly, legitimate power is additionally having a negative effect on
an antagonistic climate and a positive effect on enforced compliance; these findings lead
to a modification of theoretical assumptions. However, solely reason-based trust, but not
climate perceptions and motives, mediates the relationship between power and intended
cooperation. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
Keywords: coercive power, legitimate power, trust, authority, cooperation
INTRODUCTION
In a community, contributions to public goods are often obligatory (e.g., paying taxes in order
to finance health services), but some individuals exploit the vulnerable system, refraining from
participation, and consequently free ride (Marwell and Ames, 1979). Paying taxes and filing
insurance claims are classic real world examples of the free-rider problem. Thus, communities
employ regulating formal authorities (e.g., tax administration, insurance companies) with legal
measures to persuade free-riders to follow their obligations and to contribute for the benefit of
the community. Thereby, we define authorities as processes or individuals which organize the
cooperation in a community by an assigned social position that allows to create and maintain
environments and thereby influence the behavior of individuals (cf. Andringa et al., 2013). In
the current article, we focus on formal authorities. Such authorities have different mechanisms to
foster cooperation: the coercive power and the legitimate power (Andreoni et al., 1998; Braithwaite,
2009; Gangl et al., 2013). Employing coercive power, an authority manages behavior with strict
monitoring and heavy punishment whereas by using the legitimate power approach, an authority
operates through legitimacy of its position, expertise, a policy to disseminate relevant information,
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and its ability to make others identify with it (Andreoni et al.,
1998; Braithwaite, 2009; Gangl et al., 2013, 2015). The slippery
slope framework (Kirchler et al., 2008; Gangl et al., 2015)
postulates that the perception of both kinds of power stimulate
cooperative behavior, but that the underlying cognitions differ.
We shed light on the cognitions that are elicited via coercive
and legitimate power of authorities and in turn impact the
intention to cooperate. Earlier research shows that coercive
power and legitimate power both enhance cooperation in
public good dilemmas, where individual interests collide with
collective ones (Masclet et al., 2003; Tyler, 2006; Van Lange
et al., 2013; Hartl et al., 2015). However, the actual underlying
cognitions responsible for the increase in cooperation are not
well-understood.
According to the slippery slope framework the perception of
authorities’ power is assumed to impact individuals’ cognitions,
such as trust in authorities (implicit and reason-based trust),
the relational climate (antagonistic and service climate), and
motives for contribution (enforced compliance, voluntary
cooperation; Gangl et al., 2015). Implicit trust is diminished when
authorities apply coercive power; in contrast, reason-based trust
is strengthened by legitimate power. Coercive power induces
an antagonistic climate between authorities and individuals.
Legitimate power stimulates a service climate. Finally, coercive
power leads to enforced compliance, and legitimate power results
in voluntarily cooperation.
In this paper, we investigate the cognitions that operate
when coercive and legitimate power are wielded to prohibit
free-riding (e.g., tax evasion and insurance fraud). The study
investigates how coercive power and legitimate power solely or
in combination over perceptions of power influence trust in
authorities, the climate between authorities and individuals, and
the motives of cooperation. Additionally, it analyzes whether
the cognitions such as trust, perceived relational climates or
motives, mediate the relationship between power and intention
to cooperate.
In the remainder of this article, the impact of coercive power
and legitimate power on cooperation, trust, relational climates,
and motives are defined. Three laboratory experiments in the
tax context and one online experiment in the insurance context
are described, each assessing the impact of power. Finally, we
discuss the results and identify their theoretical and practical
implications for legislation and law enforcement.
THE IMPACT OF POWER ON
COOPERATION
Power is conceptualized as the capacity of an organization or
person to influence another parties’ behavior (e.g., Freiberg, 2010;
Gangl et al., 2015). Following theory on power (cf. harsh vs.
soft power in Raven et al., 1998; coercion vs. persuasion and
authority in Turner, 2005; instrumental vs. normative in Tyler
et al., 2010) we distinguish between two primary concepts of
power, coercive power based on deterrence and legitimate power
based on persuasion (Gangl et al., 2015). Coercive power is
defined as “harsh” power, as the capacity to detect and sanction
unlawful behavior (Raven et al., 1998; Turner, 2005). Legitimate
power is defined as “soft” power and refers to the power of
position, expertise, dissemination of relevant information, and
identification (Raven et al., 1998, cf. Tyler, 2006). Thus, legitimate
power is defined by formal and informal rules established by a
rightfully elected government (power of position), and by their
knowledge about skillful procedures (power of expertise). In
addition, information power and power of identification are seen
as means of legitimate power, whereby information, for example,
is given on how to behave in accordance with the law, and
identification with the authority means that individuals identify
with the ideas of the authority such as a specific political party.
Coercive power and legitimate power are two independent
forms, which can be wielded exclusively or in combination
(cf. French and Raven, 1959; Raven, 1992, 1993; Raven et al.,
1998). For instance, wielding coercive power by threatening
severe sanctions for unwanted behavior alone is not enough
to explain compliant and cooperative behavior (Fehr and Falk,
2002); underlying cognitions such as expectations (Copeland
and Cuccia, 2002), reciprocity (Feld and Frey, 2007), and
fairness (e.g., Hartner-Tiefenthaler et al., 2012) additionally
encourage cooperation. In line with these aspects, we argue that
legitimate power, such as distributing information about what
the “morally” desired behavior is and the expertly handling
of members’ contributions to the communal good, becomes
important. Empirical evidence shows that coercive power, as
well as legitimate power, has a positive impact on cooperative
behavior (e.g., Tyler et al., 2010; Hofmann et al., 2014; Hartl et al.,
2015). An interaction effect of coercive and legitimate power on
cooperation has not been found (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2014; Hartl
et al., 2015). Nevertheless, theoretically we would expect that the
combination of coercive power and legitimate power is affecting
the cognitions underlying cooperative behavior via perception of
power (Gangl et al., 2015). Thus, although cooperation might be
the same, the underlying cognitions are supposed to be different.
POWER AND TRUST
The application of power is strongly related to trust, whereby
trust means “to be vulnerable to the actions of another party
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to
monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995, p.
712). However, the exact nature of the dynamics and relationship
between power and trust is not clear. Power was shown to
decrease but also to increase trust in authorities (Bachmann,
2001; Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa, 2005; Mulder et al., 2006;
Weibel, 2007; Chenhall et al., 2010; Fu et al., 2013). One reason
for the divergent results might be that the decision to trust can
be either based on reasons or taken implicitly (Castelfranchi and
Falcone, 2010), resulting in two forms of trust: implicit trust
(system 1 trust) and reason-based trust (system 2 trust). Implicit
trust is defined as an automatic and unintentional reaction to
stimuli that are associated with positive past experiences or
a shared identity. For instance, a taxpayer trusts implicitly in
a tax authority, if s/he feels trust immediately without any
considerations; this automatic reaction can stem from past
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positive experiences that ended in a learning process that the
tax authority can be trusted. Reason-based trust is defined
as a deliberate decision to trust another party based on the
evaluation of the other parties’ good intentions and internal and
external fostering and hindering circumstances to comply with
the good intentions (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010). Such as
a taxpayer weighs whether a tax authority is to be trusted by
considering whether the tax authority is pursuing a goal that
is valuable to the taxpayer, whether the tax authority is acting
motivated, benevolently, and competently, and whether there
are external factors fostering or hindering the tax authority’s
actions.
The slippery slope framework argues that coercive power
damages implicit trust (Gangl et al., 2015); as coercion signals
authorities’ distrust, it may weaken affective and social bonds
with authorities, thereby interrupting habitual and implicit
cooperation (Kramer, 1999; Das and Teng, 2001). Legitimate
power, on the other hand, strengthens trust (Fu et al., 2013); when
authorities are perceived as knowledgeable and legitimate in
their position, reason-based trust increases. Perceived assistance
by experts who work on a transparent legal basis provides
many reasons to trust in the competence, motivation, and
benevolence of authorities (Bijlsma-Frankema and Van de Bunt,
2002; Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002). For reason-based trust,
a strong relationship with legitimate power is assumed because
authorities with high levels of legitimate power are perceived as
being competent to provide assistance and support (Gangl et al.,
2015).
The direct impact of power on trust might in turn also
impact cooperation. Thus, trust might be a mediator for the
relationship between power and cooperation. However, up to
now, most empirical research treats trust as a moderator of
the impact of power on cooperation. A meta-analysis shows
that power in a trusted environment leads to more cooperation
than does power that is exerted in a low-trust environment
(Balliet and Van Lange, 2013). Furthermore, experiments show
that sanctions exerted by trusted authorities, compared to
non-trusted authorities, evoke stronger moral judgments about
free-riders (Mulder et al., 2009). There is empirical evidence
that power also directly impacts trust (Kramer, 1999; Bijlsma-
Frankema and Costa, 2005; Fu et al., 2013). Thus, we assume
that trust is not only a moderator but also a mediator between
power and cooperation. Coercive and legitimate power impact
trust and might consequently influence cooperation with the
authorities.
POWER AND RELATIONAL CLIMATES
The slippery slope framework postulates that exerting power
establishes specific relational climates, whereby climate is defined
as the perceived quality of interaction between authorities and
individuals (Victor and Cullen, 1988; Martin and Cullen, 2006).
This is a “psychological climate that characterizes climate as an
individual-level and personal perception” (Ehrhart et al., 2013, p.
70). Two climates can be distinguished in relation to power, the
antagonistic climate and the service climate (Kirchler et al., 2008;
Gangl et al., 2015). Coercive power and negative experiences
with authority trigger an aversive antagonistic climate in which
distrust prevails. In such a climate, the authority convicts
members of misconduct and suspects others as criminals. In
turn, individuals hide from the authority, which justifies stricter
controls and sanctions that intensify the vicious circle of distrust
(Kirchler et al., 2008).
In contrast, legitimate power and positive impressions of
the authorities’ intents and work lead to a friendly relational
climate in which the authority acts client-oriented. In such a
service climate, the authority presents all necessary information
for the community members to behave in accordance with the
rules. It applies services to support members’ cooperation (e.g.,
preprinted tax forms) to make cooperation easier and non-
cooperation more difficult (Gangl et al., 2015).
Empirical research on the impact of power on climates is rare
(Alm and Torgler, 2006; Hofmann et al., 2014). Derived from a
study on the relationship commitment of business partners (Fu
et al., 2013), connections between power and the service climate
can be assumed. Legitimate power relates positively to a service
climate (i.e., relationship commitment), whereas coercive power
relates negatively to it. Based on these results, we predict that
in general, coercive power stimulates an antagonistic climate,
whereas legitimate power stimulates a service climate. However,
the effects on climate when coercive power and legitimate power
are exerted simultaneously are not clear as empirical studies are
lacking.
POWER AND MOTIVES FOR
COOPERATION
Forms of power also encourage different motives for cooperation
(Kirchler et al., 2008; Gangl et al., 2015). The punishment aspect
of coercive power prompts enforced compliance as threat of
severe punishment. Thus, enforced compliance is defined as
motive to cooperate because of the deterrent effect of monitoring
and punishment (Kirchler et al., 2008). Enforced motivation
only leads to cooperation when individuals fear monitoring
and punishment and therefore think there is no alternative to
comply with the rules (van Meegeren, 2001; Kirchler et al.,
2008). Coercive power is effective as long as there are sufficient
resources to detect breaches of rules and to undertake subsequent
punishment (Becker, 1968; Mulder et al., 2009). In cases in which
violations are not discovered or not avenged, coercive power is
perceived as weak and, therefore, enforced motives, as well as
cooperation decline.
Legitimate power, on the other hand, increases voluntary
cooperation. Voluntary cooperation is defined as a motivation to
cooperate with the authorities because one wants to reciprocate
the positive experience gained through applied legitimate power
(Kelman, 2006). Legitimate power activates a felt urge to
reciprocate the legitimate treatment (Feld and Frey, 2007).
Thus, individuals voluntarily accept their obligation to cooperate.
Authorities support customers and clients (e.g., tax authorities
offer pre-printed forms that can be submitted without the need
for the taxpayer to fill in the form) so that cooperation is
perceived as easy and a natural reciprocal act. Although, coercive
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power and legitimate power are assumed to increase cooperation,
the rationale behind cooperation differs fundamentally1.
When coercive and legitimate power are applied together,
the resulting motives to comply are unclear. Although, results
indicate cooperative behavior based on coercive and legitimate
power, the underlying cognitions are still unexplored (Hofmann
et al., 2014; Hartl et al., 2015). First, empirical evidence indicates
that people cooperate voluntarily when legitimate power is high,
but only under the condition that rule-breakers can be punished
(Kroll et al., 2007). Thus, the combination of coercive and
legitimate power seems to increase voluntary cooperation and
enforced compliance. In general we assume that the combination
of coercive power and legitimate has the same impact as if
coercive power and legitimate power were applied solely.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
We examine the cognitions underlying the intentions to
cooperate in different social dilemma situations. In order to
investigate differences in cognitions induced by extremely low
or high levels of coercive and/or extremely low or high levels
of legitimate power an experimental design is opted for. The
experiments allow for controlling other possible influences and
showing the pure influence of coercive and legitimate power.
The current studies were embedded in a broader research
program testing the impact of the two forms of power—solely
and combined. Hartl et al. (2015) examined the impact of
beliefs of coercive and legitimate power on tax behavior and
found a significant effect of both on experimental cooperative
behavior. However, so far, the underlying and probablymediating
cognitions of why people intent to cooperate with authority have
not been analyzed. Hence, this study investigates the underlying
cognitions of this behavior. As such, we analyze intended tax
compliance but not behavior (partial correlation controlling for
conditions between tax honesty intention and tax payments is
r = 0.58, p < 0.001 in Study 1, r = 0.60, p < 0.001 in Study 2,
and r = 0.64, p < 0.001 in Study 3). We examine the following
three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Coercive power leads to low levels of implicit trust,
an antagonistic climate, and enforced compliance.
Hypothesis 1b:Coercive power leads to low levels of implicit trust,
an antagonistic climate, and enforced compliance, when at the
same time legitimate power is wielded.
Hypothesis 2a: Legitimate power leads to reason-based trust, a
service climate, and voluntary cooperation.
Hypothesis 2b: Legitimate power leads to reason-based trust, a
service climate, and voluntary cooperation, when at the same time
coercive power is wielded.
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between coercive power and/or
legitimate power and intended cooperation is mediated by
1Although, enforced compliance and voluntary cooperation seem similar to the
concept of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000), this is not
the case. While enforced compliance is comparable to extrinsic motivation based
on external regulation, voluntary cooperation can neither be classified as other
forms of extrinsic (based on introjection, identification, integration) or intrinsic
information, because it is actually a reciprocal act.
implicit trust, reason-based trust, the antagonistic climate, the
service climate, enforced compliance and voluntary cooperation.
To test these hypotheses, following standard procedures (cf.
Kirchler et al., 2009) we conducted laboratory experiments and
an online experiment. In the laboratory experiments, participants
imagined being a taxpayer in a fictitious country (Chomland)
in which tax authorities wield coercive power (Study 1) or
legitimate power (Study 2) exclusively or in combination (Study
3). In the online experiment, coercive and legitimate power were
manipulated in combination, but rather than investigating tax
compliance, the decision concerned an insurance claim (Study 4).
To measure the level of cooperation, participants had to
decide how much of their income they declare honestly to
pay taxes and how much they claim at the insurance for
compensation, respectively. For reasons of comparison, the
designs of the four studies and the procedures are similar,
facilitating conclusions on the effects of the different forms of
power across various contexts. A between-subjects design of the
laboratory experiments assured that participants were confronted
with low or high forms of power.
STUDY 1: COERCIVE POWER IN THE TAX
CONTEXT
Methods
Participants
In all, 120 students (64%men,Mage = 24.48, SD= 5.85) majoring
in several different disciplines participated on a voluntary basis
and were paid according to their behavior in the experiment. As
student populations are specifically naïve regarding experiences
with tax authorities and our hypotheses, they specifically suit
hypotheses testing in this context (Mittone, 2006).
Experimental Design and Procedure
The study was conducted by randomly assigning participants to
one of two conditions. All participants were asked to imagine
being self-employed taxpayers in the fictitious country Chomland
with a hypothetical tax authority (for similar tax experiments see,
e.g., Kirchler et al., 2009; Andrighetto et al., 2016). Specifically
participants learnt “In each period a certain income is allocated
to you, of which you have to pay taxes. The tax rate is 40% of
your income. In each period your final income is the result of
the allocated income minus the taxes paid. At the end of the
experiment one period will be selected randomly. The income
that you have gained in this period will be paid to you by the
experimenter. Additionally, for each period there exists a tax
audit probability of 15%. In case you are audited and you have
evaded taxes, you have to pay back the evaded amount plus a fine
of 1 time the evaded amount.” The final income was paid out by
the experimenter.
In the two conditions, the tax authority held either low or high
levels of coercive power. A tax authority with low/high levels of
coercive power was, for example, described as “... well-known for
its lenient/hard sanctions.” After participants were introduced
to the experimental set-up, a taxpayer’s life was simulated using
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were asked
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to answer two items about their intention to pay taxes honestly
in this situation (tax honesty intention, two items; e.g., “How
likely is it that you, as a citizen of Chomland, state your income
and expenses totally correctly?”). After that, participants paid
their taxes, whereby at the end of the experiment participants
were remunerated based on their behavior [participants received
on average 5.99 EUR (SD = 1.22) or 7.66 USD (SD = 1.56),
respectively].
Material
In all treatment conditions, participants had to fill out a
questionnaire. The questionnaire assessed implicit trust (three
items; e.g., “I trust the tax authority in Chomland without
thinking about it.”), reason-based trust (seven items; e.g., “I trust
the tax authority in Chomland because it gives me competent
advice.”), the antagonistic climate (three items; e.g., “Between the
tax authority in Chomland and taxpayers there exists a climate of
ruthlessness.”), the service climate (three items; e.g., “Between the
tax authority in Chomland and taxpayers there exists a climate
that is characterized by its service-oriented nature.”), enforced
compliance (three items; e.g., “When I pay taxes according to the
law in Chomland, I do so because the tax authority often carries
out audits.”), and voluntary cooperation (three items; e.g., “When
I pay taxes according to the law in Chomland, I do so because
the tax authority supports taxpayers who make unintentional
mistakes.”). As a manipulation check, we asked participants’
perceptions of the tax authority’s coercive power (four items;
e.g., “I believe that the tax authority persecutes taxpayers with
audits and fines.”) and legitimate power (22 items; e.g., “I
believe that the tax authority knows how to give good advice to
taxpayers.”) by adapting published scales from the organizational
context (Hinkin and Schriesheim, 1989; Raven et al., 1998) to
the tax context (all items are listed in Supplementary Material).
The scale of legitimate power compounded four sub-scales
(legitimacy, expertise, information, identification), but for the
sake of simplicity and due to the tested measurement models,
the sub-scales were combined into one scale. Responses were
indicated on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“I totally
disagree”) to 7 (“I totally agree”). Cronbach’s α for the eight scales
were excellent and can be found in Table 1.
Socio-demographics (gender, age, income, nationality,
employment, form of employment, working hours, and
experience with tax authorities) were also assessed.
Results
Preliminary Data Analyses
To check whether the manipulation of coercive power was
successful, an ANOVA2 was performed with the perceptions of
coercive power as the dependent variable. The results showed that
the manipulation was successful as low (cplow) and high (cphigh)
levels of perceptions regarding coercive power were in line with
the manipulation (cplow:M = 2.60, SD = 1.34; cphigh:M = 5.51,
SD= 1.37; Table 1). The manipulation of coercive power had no
significant effect on the perceptions of legitimate power (Table 1).
2All ANOVAs (studies 1–4) were also undertaken as ANCOVAs with socio-
demographic control variables, resulting in the same results as the reported
ANOVA results.
TABLE 1 | Study 1: Results of the ANOVAs with coercive power as
independent variable.
Dependent variables α F (df1, df2) p ηp
2
Perceptions of coercive power 0.93 139.26 (1, 118) <0.001 0.54
Perceptions of legitimate power 0.90 0.37 (1, 118) 0.55 <0.01
Implicit trust 0.89 3.27 (1, 118) 0.07 0.03
Reason-based trust 0.84 0.00 (1, 118) 1.00 <0.01
Antagonistic climate 0.78 9.80 (1, 118) <0.01 0.08
Service climate 0.76 1.00 (1, 118) 0.32 0.01
Enforced compliance 0.94 57.97 (1, 118) <0.001 0.33
Voluntary cooperation 0.74 0.03 (1, 118) 0.87 <0.01
Intended tax honesty 0.90 6.61 (1, 118) <0.05 0.05
α, Cronbach α.
Participants experiencing low or high levels of coercive power
reported equal perceptions of legitimate power (cplow:M = 4.13,
SD= 1.04; cphigh:M = 4.24, SD= 0.90; see Table 1).
Coercive Power
The impact of coercive power on trust, climates, and motives
To test Hypothesis 1a, ANOVAs were conducted, including
coercive power (low vs. high) as factor variables and implicit
and reason-based trust, antagonistic and service climate, and
enforced compliance and voluntary cooperation as dependent
variables (see Table 1 for ANOVA results; for a graphical
representation see Figure 1 in the Discussion Section). As
expected, coercive power showed a tendency to decrease implicit
trust (cplow: M = 2.43, SD = 1.70; cphigh: M = 1.93, SD
= 1.31; Table 1). Furthermore, no matter whether participants
experienced low or high levels of coercive power, they reported
an equal intensity of reason-based trust (cplow: M = 3.50, SD =
1.28; cphigh:M = 3.50, SD= 1.25; Table 1).
Regarding the perception of the relational climate, the analysis
showed that, as expected, high levels of coercive power led to a
higher perception of an antagonistic climate (cphigh: M = 3.86,
SD = 1.68) compared to when coercive power was low (cplow:M
= 2.96, SD = 1.47; Table 1). Service climate was not affected by
different levels of coercive power (cplow: M = 3.34, SD = 1.61;
cphigh:M = 3.05, SD= 1.55; Table 1).
Regarding the motives for cooperation, as expected,
participants felt more enforced to comply when coercive
power was high (cphigh: M = 5.27, SD = 1.80) rather than low
(cplow: M = 2.73, SD = 1.86; Table 1). Participants experiencing
low or high levels of coercive power reported equal levels of
voluntary cooperation (cplow: M = 3.56, SD = 1.51; cphigh: M =
3.61, SD= 1.42; see Table 1).
The mediating role of implicit trust, the antagonistic climate,
and enforced compliance
Investigating Hypothesis 3 regarding whether implicit trust, the
perception of the antagonistic climate and enforced compliance
mediate the relationship between coercive power and the
intention to pay taxes honestly, we first tested, using an ANOVA,
whether or not the manipulation of coercive power impacted the
intention to pay taxes honestly. The manipulation of high levels
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TABLE 2 | Study 1: Mediation analysis from coercive power to tax honesty intention (THI) (standard errors in parentheses).
Path coefficients Indirect effects
To THI To IT To AC To EC Estimate Sobel Z Symmetric 95% CI
From coercive power (CP) 0.77 (0.38) −0.50 (0.28) 0.90 (0.29) 2.54 (0.33)
From implicit trust (IT) 0.28 (0.10)
From antagonistic climate (AC) −0.03 (0.11)
From enforced compliance (EC) 0.08 (0.90)
CP→IT→THI −0.14 (0.10) −1.505 −0.31; −0.01
CP→AC→THI −0.03 (0.10) −0.271 −0.20; 0.13
CP→EC→THI 0.21 (0.24) 0.088 −0.17; 0.61
of coercive power lead to higher tax honesty intention (M = 4.92,
SD = 1.70) compared to low levels of coercive power (M = 4.10,
SD= 1.78; Table 1).
In a second step, we applied the program Mediate (Hayes
et al., 2011) to test whether the relationship between coercive
power and tax honesty intention is mediated by the proposed
variables (i.e., implicit trust, antagonistic climate, and enforced
compliance) at the same time. With this method, we received
outcomes on simple (mediators and criterion regressing
on predictor) and multivariate linear regressions (criterion
regressing on mediators and on predictor; Hayes et al., 2011;
Hayes, 2013).
The mediator analysis revealed one indirect effect from
coercive power to tax honesty intention, the relation was only
found to be mediated by implicit trust (95% CI [−0.31; −0.01];
Table 2). However, Sobel test statistics (Sobel test = −1.51, p =
0.13) do not indicate a significant mediation.
Discussion
As predicted, coercive power generally has a negative impact
on implicit trust and initiates the perception of an antagonistic
climate and enforced compliance, overall confirming hypothesis
1a. Coercive power applied alone does not impact reason-
based trust, the perception of a service climate or voluntary
cooperation. In addition, the relationship between coercive
power and intended tax honesty seems not to be mediated.
Implicit trust, a perceived antagonistic climate and the enforced
motive to cooperate are not mediators. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not
confirmed.
STUDY 2: LEGITIMATE POWER IN THE TAX
CONTEXT
Methods
Participants
Overall, 130 students (60% men, Mage = 24.40, SD = 4.86)
majoring in different fields participated on a voluntary basis and
were paid based on their behavior in the experiment. Again,
this population was selected because of their naivety regarding
experiences with tax authorities (Mittone, 2006).
TABLE 3 | Study 2: Results of the ANOVAs with legitimate power as
independent variable.
Dependent variables α F (df1, df2) p ηp
2
Perceptions of coercive power 0.89 13.38 (1, 128) <0.001 0.10
Perceptions of legitimate power 0.95 79.66 (1, 128) <0.001 0.38
Implicit trust 0.88 1.84 (1, 128) 0.18 0.01
Reason-based trust 0.89 59.04 (1, 128) <0.001 0.32
Antagonistic climate 0.83 41.15 (1, 128) <0.001 0.24
Service climate 0.88 47.11 (1, 128) <0.001 0.27
Enforced compliance 0.91 19.75 (1, 128) <0.001 0.13
Voluntary cooperation 0.85 13.81 (1, 128) <0.001 0.10
Intended tax honesty 0.78 20.38 (1, 128) <0.001 0.14
α, Cronbach α.
Experimental Design and Procedure
The experimental design and procedure was similar to Study
1. Two conditions were used, in which the tax authority was
described as holding either low or high levels of legitimate
power. The tax authority with low levels of legitimate power was
characterized as being, for example, “poorly appreciated for its
work”; the ones holding high levels of legitimate power were
presented as, for example, being “highly appreciated for its work.”
The scenario contains all aspects of legitimate power (legitimacy,
expertise, dissemination of information, and identification).
Cronbach’s α for the eight scales were excellent and can be found
in Table 3. The participants were remunerated according to their
behavior and received, on average, 6.40 EUR (SD = 1.38) or 8.18
USD (SD= 1.76), respectively.
Results
Preliminary Data Analyses
The manipulation was successful as low and high levels
of legitimate power induced perceptions according to the
manipulation (lplow: M = 3.16, SD = 1.05; lphigh: M = 4.89,
SD = 1.16; Table 2). Surprisingly, the analysis showed that the
manipulation of legitimate power had a significant impact on
the perceptions of coercive power (Table 3). The perceptions of
coercive power were higher when legitimate power was high
(lphigh: M = 4.51, SD = 1.57) rather than low (lplow: M = 3.48,
SD= 1.64).
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TABLE 4 | Study 2: Mediation analysis from legitimate power to tax honesty intention (THI) (standard errors in parentheses).
Path coefficients Indirect effects
To THI To RBT To SC To VC Estimate Sobel Z Symmetric 95% CI
From legitimate power (LP) 0.79 (0.32) 1.74 (0.23) 1.89 (0.28) 1.06 (0.29)
From reason-based trust (RBT) 0.28 (0.15)
From service climate (SC) −0.10 (0.11)
From voluntary cooperation (VC) 0.09 (0.11)
LP→RBT→THI 0.48 (0.27) 1.812 0.05; 0.94
LP→SC→THI −0.18 (0.20) 0.900 −0.51; 0.15
LP→VC→THI 0.09 (0.12) 0.798 −0.09; 0.30
Legitimate Power
The impact of legitimate power on trust, climates, and
motives.
Testing Hypothesis 2a, ANOVAs were conducted including
legitimate power (low vs. high) as factor and implicit and
reason-based trust, antagonistic and service climate and enforced
compliance and voluntary cooperation as dependent variables
(see Table 3 for ANOVA results; for a graphical representation
see Figure 1 in the Discussion Section). Regardless of whether
or not participants experienced low or high levels of legitimate
power, they reported an equal intensity of implicit trust (lplow:
M = 1.97, SD = 1.55; lphigh: M = 2.34, SD = 1.54; see Table 3).
As expected, participants experiencing high levels of legitimate
power reported high levels of reason-based trust (lplow:M= 2.55,
SD= 1.09; lphigh:M = 4.29, SD= 1.48; see Table 3).
Regarding the perception of the relational climate,
unexpectedly the analysis revealed that low levels of legitimate
power led to a higher perception of an antagonistic climate (lplow:
M = 4.47, SD = 1.47) compared to when legitimate power was
high (lphigh: M = 2.80, SD = 1.48). In line with the hypothesis,
the perception of a service climate increased with legitimate
power (lplow: M = 2.57, SD = 1.50; lphigh: M = 4.46, SD = 1.64;
see Table 3).
Regarding the motives for cooperation, participants in the
condition of high levels of legitimate power felt more enforced to
comply (lphigh:M= 4.70, SD= 1.68) compared to participants in
the condition of low levels of legitimate power (lplow: M = 3.36,
SD = 1.75). In line with predictions, participants experiencing
high levels of legitimate power reported higher levels of voluntary
cooperation (lphigh: M = 3.90, SD = 1.61) than did participants
experiencing low levels of legitimate power (lplow: M = 2.84, SD
= 1.65; see Table 3).
The mediating role of reason-based trust, the service climate,
and voluntary cooperation.
Testing Hypothesis 3, we first investigated for the impact of
legitimate power on tax honesty intention. The ANOVA revealed
that high levels of legitimate power lead to higher tax honesty
intention (M = 4.92, SD = 1.43) compared to low levels of
legitimate power (M = 3.74, SD= 1.55; Table 3).
In a second step, we used Mediate (Hayes et al., 2011) for
the mediator analysis. The findings showed that an indirect
effect from legitimate power to tax honesty intention was solely
explained by reason-based trust (95% CI [0.05; 0.94]; Table 4).
Also Sobel test statistics (Sobel test= 1.81, p= 0.07; RM = 0.62
3)
do by trend indicate this significant mediation.
Discussion
Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, high levels of legitimate power
have a positive effect on reason-based trust, on the perception of a
service climate and on voluntary cooperation. Not hypothesized,
high levels of legitimate power also increase perceptions of
coercive power, and higher enforced compliance. Furthermore,
legitimate power profoundly reduces the perception of an
antagonistic climate. Although, coercive power was assumed to
be the only quality of power to have an impact on enforced
compliance and the perception of an antagonistic climate,
the findings point out that legitimate power is additionally
interfering. Regarding Hypothesis 3, only reason-based trust
is by trend mediating the relationship between legitimate
power and tax honesty intention. In the third experiment, the
relationship between coercive power and legitimate power is
examined.
STUDY 3: COERCIVE POWER AND
LEGITIMATE POWER COMBINED IN THE
TAX CONTEXT
Methods
Participants
Analogous to Study 1 and 2, 368 students (34% men, Mage =
24.26, SD = 5.56) majoring in different disciplines participated
in the experiment and were paid based on their behavior in the
experiment.
Experimental Design and Procedure
Experimental design and procedure were similar to Studies 1 and
2, but four conditions were designed in which the hypothetical
tax authority held either low or high levels of coercive power
and low or high levels of legitimate power. The combination of
low/high levels of coercive power and low/high levels of legitimate
power was operationalized through scenarios (e.g., “In general,
3We us RM, the ration of the indirect effect to the direct effect, as an effect size for
the mediation (Preacher and Kelley, 2011).
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the tax authority is known for its low/high penalties for tax
evasion, and is little/very appreciated for its work.”). Cronbach’s
α’s are excellent and are presented in Table 3. Participants
were remunerated according to their behavior and received,
on average, 6.21 EUR (SD = 1.32) or 7.94 USD (SD = 1.69),
respectively.
Results
In the following, only hypothesized and/or significant results are
reported; however, for completeness, Table 5 displays all findings
independently of whether or not they were significant.
Preliminary Data Analyses
Checking the coercive power manipulation with the participants’
perceptions of coercive power, the ANOVA showed that low
and high levels of coercive power conditions induced respective
perceptions (cplow:M = 2.67, SD= 1.21; cphigh:M = 5.50, SD=
1.33; Table 5).
Likewise, a manipulation check for legitimate power
confirmed the manipulation (Table 5). Participants experiencing
high levels of legitimate power reported perceptions of higher
legitimate power (lphigh: M = 4.82, SD = 0.94) than did
participants who experienced low levels of legitimate power
(lplow: M = 3.20, SD = 0.99). Similar to Study 2, the analysis
showed that the manipulation of legitimate power had a
significant impact on the perceptions of coercive power
(Table 5). Participants perceived coercive power to be stronger
when legitimate power was high (lphigh: M = 4.82, SD = 0.94)
rather than low (lplow:M = 3.20, SD= 0.99).
Coercive Power and Legitimate Power
The impact of coercive and legitimate power on trust,
climates, and motives
Testing Hypotheses 1b and 2b, 2 (low vs. high levels of coercive
power) by 2 (low vs. high levels of legitimate power) ANOVAs
with the depending variables implicit and reason-based trust,
antagonistic and service climate and enforced compliance and
voluntary cooperation were applied. Contrary to expectations,
participants in conditions with low/high levels of coercive power
and low/high levels of legitimate power reported equal intensity
of implicit trust (main effects: cplow: M = 2.17, SD = 1.39;
cphigh: M = 2.00, SD = 1.33; lplow: M = 2.02, SD = 1.39; lphigh
M = 2.16, SD = 1.33; see Table 5; for a graphical representation
see Figure 1 in the Discussion Section). Regarding reason-based
trust, the analysis revealed, as expected, that participants reported
higher levels of reason-based trust when legitimate power was
high (lphigh: M = 4.39, SD = 1.17; lplow: M = 2.69, SD = 1.04;
see Table 5).
Regarding the perception of the relational climate, the analysis
showed that the perception of an antagonistic climate increased
with coercive power (cplow: M = 3.35, SD = 1.51; cphigh:
M = 4.08, SD = 1.81) and decreased with legitimate power
(lplow: M = 3.38, SD = 1.58; lphigh: M = 3.03, SD = 1.56; see
Table 5). Furthermore, as expected, the analysis showed that the
perception of a service climate increased with legitimate power
(lplow: M = 2.47, SD = 1.33; lphigh: M = 4.11, SD = 1.43, see
Table 5).
TABLE 5 | Study 3: Results of the ANOVAs with coercive power and
legitimate power as independent variables.
Dependent variables α F (df1, df2) p ηp
2
Perceptions of coercive power 0.91
CP 459.61 (1, 364) <0.001 0.56
LP 5.71 (1, 364) 0.02 0.02
CPxLP 0.18 (1, 364) 0.68 <0.01
Perceptions of legitimate power 0.94
CP 0.26 (1, 364) 0.61 <0.01
LP 260.33 (1, 364) <0.001 0.42
CPxLP 0.07 (1, 364) 0.79 <0.01
Implicit trust 0.86
CP 1.42 (1, 364) 0.24 <0.01
LP 0.94 (1, 364) 0.33 <0.01
CPxLP 0.09 (1, 364) 0.76 <0.01
Reason-based trust 0.86
CP 1.29 (1, 364) 0.26 <0.01
LP 217.19 (1, 364) <0.001 0.37
CPxLP 1.78 (1, 364) 0.18 <0.01
Antagonistic climate 0.84
CP 21.40 (1, 364) <0.001 0.06
LP 70.871 (1, 364) <0.001 0.16
CPxLP 0.33 (1, 364) 0.56 <0.01
Service climate 0.85
CP 0.09 (1, 364) 0.76 <0.01
LP 128.81 (1, 364) <0.001 0.26
CPxLP 1.08 (1, 364) 0.30 <0.01
Enforced compliance 0.92
CP 90.24 (1, 364) <0.001 0.20
LP 5.49 (1, 364) 0.02 0.02
CPxLP 0.07 (1, 364) 0.79 <0.01
Voluntary cooperation 0.83
CP 0.11 (1, 364) 0.75 <0.01
LP 45.37 (1, 364) <0.001 0.11
CPxLP 0.02 (1, 364) 0.89 <0.01
Intended tax honesty 0.86
CP 34.50 (1, 364) <0.001 0.09
LP 19.75 (1, 364) <0.001 0.05
CPxLP 0.04 (1, 364) 0.85 <0.01
α, Cronbach α; CP, main effect coercive power; LP, main effect legitimate power; CPxLP,
interaction effect of coercive and legitimate power.
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Regarding the motives for cooperation, the analysis
highlighted that, as expected, in conditions with low levels
of coercive power, participants reported feeling less enforced
than in conditions with high levels of coercive power (cplow: M
= 3.35, SD = 1.67; cphigh: M = 5.06, SD = 1.80; see Table 5).
Furthermore, as expected, participants reported more voluntary
cooperation when legitimate power was high (lphigh: M = 4.04,
SD = 1.55; lplow: M = 2.99, SD = 1.43, see Table 5). No other
main effects and no interaction effects were significant (see
Table 5).
The mediating role of trust, climate, and motive.
Testing Hypothesis 3, the ANOVA found that coercive and
legitimate power had a significant impact on intended tax
honesty and that no significant interaction existed. High levels of
coercive power led to higher tax honesty intention (M = 4.98,
SD = 1.41) than did low levels of coercive power (M = 4.02,
SD = 1.78). Similarly, manipulations of high levels of legitimate
power stimulated higher tax honesty intention (M = 4.86, SD
= 1.50) than did lower legitimate power (M = 4.13, SD = 1.76;
Table 5).
In a second step, we again used Mediate (Hayes et al., 2011)
for the mediator analysis, this time working with two predictors,
i.e., coercive power and legitimate power. The results showed that
there is only one indirect effect, that is, from legitimate power
to tax honesty intention via reason-based trust (95% CI [0.10;
0.65]; Table 6). Also Sobel test statistics (Sobel test = 2.11, p =
0.03; RM = 0.37) do indicate this significant mediation. All the
other indirect effects from coercive and legitimate power are not
significant.
Discussion
The analyses partly confirm Hypotheses 1b and 2b. The
manipulation of coercive power and legitimate power at the same
time in the context of taxpaying confirmed that in cases of high
levels of coercive power, the antagonistic climate and enforced
compliance are more distinct. In addition, higher legitimate
power induced reason-based trust, a distinct service climate and
voluntary cooperation. Contrary to Hypothesis 1b, high levels of
coercive power did not reduce implicit trust. Also, high levels of
legitimate power fundamentally reduced an antagonistic climate.
Regarding the mediating effect testing Hypothesis 3, only reason-
based trust mediated the relationship between legitimate power
and tax honesty intention. In Study 4 the impact of coercive
power and legitimate power is investigated in another situation.
STUDY 4: COERCIVE POWER AND
LEGITIMATE POWER COMBINED IN THE
INSURANCE CONTEXT
Methods
Participants
Overall, 102 students (83% men, Mage = 22.66, SD = 3.12)
majoring in industrial engineering participated in the study. For
participation, all students received bonus points for one of their
courses. Again, this population primarily was selected because
TABLE 6 | Study 3: Mediation analysis from power to tax honesty intention (THI; standard errors in parentheses).
Path coefficients Indirect effects
To THI To IT To RBT To AC To SC To EC To VC Estimate Sobel Z Symmetric
95% CI
From covercive power (CP) 1.02 (0.18) −0.17 (0.14) 0.13 (0.12) 0.74 (1.16) −0.04 (0.14) 1.71 (0.18) −0.05 (0.16)
From legitimate power (LP) 0.32 (0.22) 0.14 (0.14) 1.71 (0.12) −1.34 (0.16) 1.64 (0.14) 0.42 (0.18) 1.05 (0.16)
From implicit trust (IT) 0.04 (0.06)
From reason-based trust (RBT) 0.22 (0.10)
From antagonistic climate (AC) −0.04 (0.06)
From service climate (SC) −0.05 (0.07)
From enforced compliance (EC) −0.03 (0.05)
From voluntary cooperation (VC) 0.08 (0.07)
CP→IT→THI −0.01 (0.02) −0.584 −0.04; 0.01
LP→IT→THI 0.01 (0.01) 0.554 −0.01; 0.03
CP→RBT→THI 0.03 (0.03) 0.972 −0.01; 0.08
LP→RBT→THI 0.37 (0.17) 2.174 0.10; 0.65
CP→AC→THI −0.03 (0.05) −0.461 −0.10; 0.04
LP→AC→THI 0.05 (0.08) 0.664 −0.08; 0.18
CP→SC→THI 0.00 (0.01) 0.265 −0.02; 0.02
LP→SC→THI −0.09 (0.11) −0.831 −0.28; 0.10
CP→EC→THI −0.05 (0.08) −0.599 −0.19; 0.09
LP→EC→THI 0.09 (0.08) −0.581 −0.05; 0.02
CP→VC→THI −0.00 (0.02) −0.301 −0.04; 0.02
LP→VC→THI 0.09 (0.08) 1.126 −0.04; 0.21
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of their naivety regarding the hypotheses and because of their
inexperience with insurance organizations.
Experimental Design and Procedure
In contrast to Studies 1–3, in Study 4 scenarios in an online
experiment were used in which an insurance organization was
presented as wielding high or low levels of coercive power
and high or low levels of legitimate power. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions. The combination
of low/high levels of coercive power and of low/high levels of
legitimate power was operationalized through items such as,
“In general, the insurance company is known for its low/high
penalties for insurance fraud. It is little/very appreciated for its
work.” After the scenarios, the respondents had to report damage
to the insurance organization. They had to “... imagine that [their]
television set broke from the wall so that it was now in pieces.
The television set had a value of 600 MU [MU, monetary units],
which [they] had to report to the insurance company according
to the terms. With the help of a friend, who can fake an invoice
up to a maximum of 1000 MU, [they] could report a higher
claim to the insurance company.” The amounts of respondents’
claims (ranging from 600 to 1.000 MU) were collected to assess
their relative cooperation with the insurance organization and
will further be displayed in percentages [(reported amount −
600)/400]. The questionnaire that was used in Studies 1–3 was
adapted to the insurance context and was applied to measure
insurance fraud intention [one item; “Which damage sum would
you claim at the insurance company (min. 600 MU, max. 1000
MU):”], implicit trust (three items; e.g., “I trust the insurance
company Chom-Insurance without thinking about it.”), reason-
based trust (seven items; e.g., “I trust the insurance company
Chom-Insurance, because it gives me competent advice.”), the
antagonistic climate (three items; e.g., “Between the insurance
company Chom-Insurance and the insurants, there exists a
climate of ruthlessness.”), the service climate (three items; e.g.,
“Between the insurance company Chom-Insurance and the
insurants, there exists a climate, which is characterized by its
service-oriented nature.”), enforced compliance (three items; e.g.,
“When I hand in my damage claims according to the rules of
Chom-Insurance, I do so because the insurance company often
carries out controls.”), and voluntary cooperation (three items;
e.g., “When I hand in my damage claims according to the rules
with Chom-Insurance, I do so because the insurance company
supports me if I have unintentionally filled in my damage
claim incorrectly.”). Analog to the tax context, the participants’
perceptions regarding wielded coercive power (four items; e.g., “I
believe that the insurance company Chom-Insurance persecutes
insurance fraudsters with audits and fines.”) and legitimate power
(22 items; e.g., “I believe that the insurance company Chom-
Insurance knows how to give good advice to insurants.”) of the
insurance organization were adapted for insurance and assessed
as manipulation check. Responses were indicated on a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“I totally disagree”) to 7 (“I
totally agree”). Cronbach’s α’s are excellent and presented in
Table 7. Socio-demographics (gender, age, income, nationality,
employment, and experience with insurance organizations) were
also assessed.
TABLE 7 | Study 4: Results of the ANOVAs with coercive power and
legitimate power as independent variables.
Dependent variables α F (df1, df2) p ηp
2
Perceptions of coercive power 0.87
CP 69.94 (1, 98) <0.001 0.42
LP 0.90 (1, 98) 0.35 <0.01
CPxLP 5.99 (1, 98) 0.02 0.06
Perceptions of legitimate power 0.94
CP 0.46 (1, 98) 0.50 <0.01
LP 16.80 (1, 98) <0.001 0.15
CPxLP 0.16 (1, 98) 0.69 <0.01
Implicit trust 0.95
CP 1.14 (1, 98) 0.29 0.01
LP 1.43 (1, 98) 0.23 0.01
CPxLP 0.00 (1, 98) 0.29 0.01
Reason-based Trust 0.88
CP 0.01 (1, 98) 0.94 <0.01
LP 23.67 (1, 98) <0.001 0.20
CPxLP 0.00 (1, 98) 0.95 <0.01
Antagonistic climate 0.89
CP 7.62 (1, 98) <0.01 0.07
LP 4.47 (1, 98) 0.04 0.04
CPxLP 1.73 (1, 98) 0.19 0.02
Service climate 0.88
CP 1.08 (1, 98) 0.30 0.01
LP 26.69 (1, 98) <0.001 0.21
CPxLP 0.30 (1, 98) 0.59 <0.01
Enforced compliance 0.89
CP 4.56 (1, 98) 0.04 0.04
LP 3.30 (1, 98) 0.07 0.03
CPxLP 0.23 (1, 98) 0.63 <0.01
Voluntary cooperation 0.81
CP 2.73 (1, 98) 0.13 0.02
LP 10.72 (1, 98) 0.001 0.10
CPxLP 0.06 (1, 98) 0.81 <0.01
Intended insurance fraud
CP 2.03 (1, 98) 0.16 0.02
LP 0.00 (1, 98) 0.99 <0.01
CPxLP 1.46 (1, 98) 0.23 0.02
α, Cronbach α; CP, main effect coercive power; LP, main effect legitimate power; CPxLP,
interaction effect of coercive and legitimate power.
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Results
In the following, only hypothesized and/or significant results
are reported; for completeness, Table 7 displays all findings
independently, whether significant or not.
Preliminary Data Analyses
The manipulation check showed that perceptions on coercive
power and legitimate power were induced in line with the
manipulation (Table 7). Participants held perceptions of lower
coercive power in the low levels of coercive power condition
(cplow: M = 3.17, SD = 1.32) than in the high levels of
coercive power condition (cphigh:M = 5.28, SD = 1.31). A weak
interaction of coercive and legitimate power on the perceptions of
coercive power existed, but as this interaction explains only 6% of
the variance and the main effect of coercive power explains 42%,
this interaction is negligible. Participants experiencing high levels
of legitimate power held perceptions of higher legitimate power
(lphigh: M = 4.74, SD = 1.14) than the participants experiencing
low legitimate power (lplow:M = 3.79, SD= 1.15; Table 7).
Coercive Power and Legitimate Power
The impact of coercive and legitimate power on trust,
climates, and motives
Testing Hypotheses 1b and 2b, 2 (low vs. high levels of
coercive power) by 2 (low vs. high levels of legitimate power)
ANOVAs with the dependent variables implicit and reason-
based trust, antagonistic and service climate and enforced
compliance and voluntary cooperation were conducted. Similar
to the experiments in the tax context, participants in conditions
with low/high levels of coercive power and low/high levels of
legitimate power reported equal intensity of implicit trust (main
effects: cplow: M = 2.02, SD = 1.62; cphigh: M = 2.35, SD
= 1.55; lplow: M = 2.00, SD = 1.43; lphigh M = 2.40, SD =
1.70, see Table 7; for a graphical representation see Figure 1
in the Discussion Section). As expected, participants reported
high levels of reason-based trust when legitimate power was high
(lphigh: M = 4.46, SD = 1.14; lplow: M = 3.22, SD = 1.37, see
Table 7).
The analysis showed that, as expected, the perception of an
antagonistic climate increased with coercive power (cplow: M =
2.84, SD= 1.71; cphigh:M = 3.84, SD= 1.85) and decreased with
legitimate power (lplow: M = 3.84, SD = 1.81; lphigh: M = 2.99,
SD= 1.81, see Table 7). Furthermore, as expected, the perception
of a service climate increased only with legitimate power (lplow:M
= 3.05, SD= 1.62; lphigh:M = 4.58, SD= 1.33, see Table 7).
Regarding motives for cooperation, the analysis showed
that, as expected, participants in conditions with low levels
of coercive power reported feeling less enforced (cplow: M =
3.69, SD = 1.81) compared to conditions with high levels of
coercive power (cphigh: M = 4.37, SD = 1.66; see Table 7). As
expected, participants reported more voluntary cooperationwhen
legitimate power was high (lphigh: M = 4.35, SD = 1.49; lplow:
M = 3.37, SD = 1.44, see Table 7). No other main effects or
interaction effects were significant (see Table 7).
The mediating role of trust, climate, and motive
Testing Hypothesis 3, an ANOVA revealed no significant main
effect of coercive power, no impact of legitimate power and no
significant interaction (Table 7).
In a second step, we applied again the program Mediate
(Hayes et al., 2011) for the mediator analysis. The results revealed
that there are three indirect effects from power to insurance
fraud. First, legitimate power impacts insurance fraud intention
via reason-based trust (95% CI [−20.80; −0.44], Table 8).
Second, coercive power impacts insurance fraud intention via
enforced compliance (95% CI [0.77; 10.64]) and third, legitimate
power also impacts insurance fraud intention via enforced
compliance (95% CI [0.28; 9.38]). However, Sobel test statistics
revealed only a trend for a mediation from coercive power to
enforced compliance to insurance fraud (CP→EC→IFI: Sobel
test = −1.72, p =.08; RM = −0.26). All other mediation were
not significant (LP→RBT→IFI: Sobel test = −1.60, p = 0.11;
LP→EC→IFI: Sobel test = 1.52, p = 0.13). The other indirect
effects from coercive and legitimate power are not significant.
Discussion
The predictions of Hypotheses 1b and 2b are partly confirmed.
The combination of coercive and legitimate power backs up
the prediction that coercive power impacts the antagonistic
climate and enforced compliance (Hypothesis 1b). Furthermore,
legitimate power had a positive impact on reason-based trust,
the perception of a service climate and voluntary cooperation
(Hypothesis 2b). In line with Study 3 but contrary to predictions,
legitimate power reduced the antagonistic climate. In contrast to
Studies 1–3, results of the mediator analysis showed that coercive
power increases enforced compliance, which in turn decreases
the intention to commit insurance fraud.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overall, all four studies confirm the hypothesized impact of
coercive and legitimate on cognitions when deciding to cooperate
with authorities (Figure 1). As expected, when coercive power
was applied exclusively, it decreased implicit trust, increased the
perception of an antagonistic climate, and enforced compliance.
For the combined prevalence of coercive and legitimate power,
coercive power does not impact implicit trust, but leads to a
perceived antagonistic climate and to an enforced motive to
comply. The missing impact of coercive power on implicit trust,
when combined with legitimate power, might stem from the fact
that legitimate power stimulates rational considerations because
of reason-based trust, and rational considerations are aspect
of system 2, so that implicit trust (system 1) cannot arise (cf.
Sittenthaler et al., 2015). Coercive power has a direct impact on
tax cooperation intention and an indirect effect mediated via
enforced compliance on insurance fraud intention.
As expected, legitimate power (wielded exclusively or in
combination with coercive power) increases reason-based trust,
the perception of a service climate and the motive to cooperate
voluntarily. The relationship of legitimate power and intended
cooperative behavior is mediated by reason-based trust.
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FIGURE 1 | The impact of coercive and legitimate power on the trust, climate, and motive scales in Study 1–4.
Two unexpected results were found. First, in Study 2, and
by tendency in Studies 3 and 4, legitimate power, contrary
to expectations, increased the enforced motive to cooperate.
One explanation is that due to feelings of reciprocity, even the
wielding of legitimate power might make participants experience
some “social” coercion that is responsible for motives of enforced
compliance. This is in line with Ouchi’s (1979) informal clan
control, which sees reciprocity and a legitimate organization as
the foundation. Additionally, social agreement, such as common
values and beliefs, would constitute a further pre-requisite for
clan control. Another possible reason is that legitimate power
leads to the impression that authorities have a high proficiency
for detecting and punishing defecting individuals, which results
in feelings of enforced compliance. This result shows that a
relations between legitimate power and enforced compliance
needs to be included in the Slippery Slope Framework (Gangl
et al., 2015) so that future research will consider this issue.
Second, contrary to expectations but in line with earlier
findings (Hofmann et al., 2014), legitimate power, even
when combined with coercive power, reduced the perceived
antagonistic climate (Studies 2–4). When combined, the exertion
of audits and fines (i.e., coercive power) can be believed to
be legitimate and, thus, be accepted as the right thing to do.
This assumption was supported by Study 2, which showed that
coercive power is more pronounced when legitimate power is
rather high (in this study, only legitimate power was manipulated
and no information on coercive power was given). Then, trust
in authorities and relational climates were more effected by
legitimate power than by coercive power alone. This is suggested
by the relatively strong impact of legitimate power on reason-
based trust in Study 2–4. Overall, the present results certainly
indicate a connection between coercive power and legitimate
power. With the current experiments, this connection, e.g., how
the application of legitimate power impacts the perception of
coercive power, cannot sufficiently be tested, but the Slippery
Slope Framework (Gangl et al., 2015) needs to be modified
including a connection between coercive power and legitimate
power and future research will have to investigate this aspect.
The current studies have some limitations that have to be
addressed in future research. The research theoretically bases
on the slippery slope framework postulating that authorities’
different forms of power influence cognitions and subsequently
cooperative behavior. It can be argued that this causal
relationship could be the other way round that not power
impacts cognitions but actual cognitions are responsible for
the perceptions of power. This certainly can be the case and
needs further empirical evidence, nevertheless, as our studies
show, there certainly is a significant impact of power on
cognitions. As withmost laboratory experiments, the investigated
samples are not representative, they are specifically comprised
of students who are not well-experienced with tax authorities
and/or insurance organizations. This, nonetheless, is actually an
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TABLE 8 | Study 4: Mediation analysis from power to insurance fraud intention (IFI; standard errors in parentheses).
Path coefficients Indirect effects
To IFI To IT To RBT To AC To SC To EC To VC Estimate Sobel Z Symmetric
95% CI
From covercive power (CP) −18.96 (7.39) 0.36 (0.32) −0.02 (0.25) 0.94 (0.35) −0.32 (0.29) 0.72 (0.34) −0.45 (0.29)
From legitimate power (LP) 1.83 (7.86) 0.42 (0.31) 1.24 (0.25) −0.80 (0.35) 1.51 (0.29) 0.60 (0.34) 0.95 (0.29)
From implicit trust (IT) 4.10 (2.43)
From reason-based trust (RBT) −7.99 (4.74)
From antagonistic climate (AC) 2.23 (2.78)
From service climate (SC) 1.45 (4.46)
From enforced compliance (EC) 6.89 (2.32)
From voluntary cooperation (VC) 0.76 (3.19)
CP→IT→IFI 1.46 (1.75) 0.936 −0.69; 4.77
LP→IT→IFI 1.72 (1.81) 1.056 −0.51; 5.13
CP→RBT→IFI 0.15 (2.38) 0.080 −3.70; 4.21
LP→RBT→IFI −9.89 (6.14) −1.596 −20.80; −0.44
CP→AC→IFI 2.10 (2.89) 0.769 −2.09; 7.34
LP→AC→IFI −1.77 (2.51) −0.076 −6.31; 1.79
CP→SC→IFI −0.46 (1.98) −0.311 −4.08; 2.31
LP→SC→IFI 2.19 (6.89) 0.032 −8.62; 13.70
CP→EC→IFI 4.99 (3.09) 1.724 0.77; 10.64
LP→EC→IFI 4.16 (2.85) 1.517 0.28; 9.38
CP→VC→IFI −0.35 (1.74) −1.375 −3.43; 2.39
LP→VC→IFI 0.73 (3.15) 0.238 −4.29; 6.02
advantage. For naïve participants, it is easier to imagine the
fictitious scenario and act based on the presented scenarios and
not on prior experiences with the authority (Mittone, 2006).
That said, laboratory experiments still create a highly artificial
situation in which individuals might not behave as in an everyday
context. Therefore, allowing participants to take part in an online
experiment at home (Study 4) is a possibility to counteract this
artificiality without changing manipulation. Nevertheless, future
field experiments that not only investigate the direct impact of
power on cooperation (e.g., Ariel, 2012; Gangl et al., 2014) but
also investigate the underlying processes could strengthen the
current results; tax authorities and/or insurance organizations
displaying coercive and/or legitimate power would show the
effects of power in vivo. Furthermore, the experimental design
of the current study can only test for differences. The correlative
connections between power and processes are only assumed.
Thus, this design only allows for limited conclusions regarding
the mediators since they are based on manipulated factors
of fictitious authorities and not on actual existing authorities.
However, due to the experimental setting, we were able to obtain
high internal validity. Future research needs to increase external
validity and address the studied relationships by using field data.
Literature indicates that the severity of punishment is
contingent on the type of social dilemma situation (Molenmaker
et al., 2014). It has to be mentioned that legal circumstances of
tax authorities and insurance organizations are different. While
in comparison to tax authorities, insurance organizations do
not have the legal right to punish insurance fraud. Taxpayers,
compared to insurance holders, also do not have the option to
turn to another tax authority if they are not satisfied with a
specific tax authority’s conduct. Taxpayers are at the mercy of one
specific tax authority in a certain country. Nevertheless, results
on the impact of power work similarly in both contexts. The two
authorities in the studies, the tax authority and the insurance
organization, represent a small range of authorities that wield
power to control individuals’ behavior in different situations. In
future research, other institutions, such as governments ensuring
citizens’ environmental friendliness, should be investigated.
Research on how their power affects trust, relational climates, and
motives for cooperation will further support, as well as extend,
current findings.
From a practical point of view, the present findings are of
value, not only for tax authorities and insurance companies, but
for all authorities wielding power. Results show that sanctions
of undesired behavior, as well as legitimate procedures, both
not only foster cooperation, but also have different impacts on
underlying cognitions. Severe punishments lead to a hostile and
antagonistic climate that should be avoided, whereas supportive
procedures foster trust toward the authority and the perception
of a reciprocative service climate. Legitimate power operates via
establishing reason-based trust. Tax authorities and insurance
organizations are supposed to reduce costly punishments,
provide supportive procedures and helpful information, and
pursue societal goals to assure a service climate. This would, in
the long run, create trust toward them which fosters cooperative
behavior. The findings also indicate that strict audits and severe
fines might alienate individuals that are either reacting with
enforced compliance or looking for more appealing alternatives.
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Thus, the current results should initiate rethinking power of all
authorities shaping individual behavior.
Highlighting the mechanisms by experimentally showing
how coercive and/or legitimate power of authorities affect
trust in authorities, the relational climate, and their motives
over different contexts expanded the understanding of the
operating mode of authorities’ power. While the mediating
effects clearly show that a key factor in understanding the
mechanisms is reason-based trust, implicit trust, the relational
climates and motives to comply become of marginal interest.
They are mainly a product of specific forms of power,
but they do not interfere with the actual connection of
power and behavioral intention. These findings have extensive
consequences for theory, as well as for real world authorities,
giving direction for future research and specifying actions
for power wielding authorities. In a nutshell, trust building
measures are central, as reason-based trust is mediating
the impact of power on cooperation, but other cognitions
(interaction climates, motives) might not have that importance
for cooperation.
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